Aesthetic ineffability by Jonas, Silvia
Silvia Jonas 
Aesthetic Ineffability 
(26. Oct. 2016; accepted draft, forthcoming in Philosophy Compass) 
 
Abstract: 
This essay provides an overview of the ways in which contemporary philosophers 
have tried to make sense of ineffability as encountered in aesthetic contexts. 
Section 1 sets up the problem of aesthetic ineffability by putting it into historical 
perspective. Section 2 specifies the kinds of questions that may be raised with 
regard to aesthetic ineffability, as well as the kinds of answer each one of those 
questions would require. Section 3 investigates arguments that seek to locate 
aesthetic ineffability within the object of aesthetic experiences, i.e. within 
aesthetic content. Section 4 discusses arguments that seek to locate aesthetic 
ineffability within the subject of aesthetic experience. 
 
The idea that there are things in the world that cannot be captured in language has 
“one of the longest and most distinguished of philosophical histories” (Moore, Human 
Finitude, 427). Within philosophical sub-fields, the concept of ineffability has been 
particularly prominent in aesthetics and the philosophy of art. A dialogue in 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations describes the phenomenon in a nutshell: 
“I am inclined to say: “These notes say something glorious, but I do not know 
what.” These notes are a powerful gesture, but I cannot put anything side by side 
with it that will serve as an explanation. A grave nod. James: “We lack the 
words.” Then why don’t we introduce new ones? What would have to be the 
case for us to be able to?” (Wittgenstein §610) 
 
This essay provides an overview of the ways in which contemporary 
philosophers have tried to make sense of ineffability as encountered in aesthetic 
contexts.1 It is divided into four parts. Section 1 sets up the problem of aesthetic 
ineffability by putting it into historical perspective and clarifying some key concepts. 
Section 2 specifies the kinds of questions that may be raised with regard to aesthetic 
                                                      
1 Aesthetic experiences do not necessarily presuppose the presence of a work of art: they can also occur 
in the presence of extraordinarily impressive natural settings (Adorno speaks of the “Naturschöne”, 
Kant of the “Sublime”). For the sake of simplicity, I will restrict the examples of my argument to 
aesthetic experiences afforded by works of art. However, all arguments that will be discussed can 
potentially be applied to aesthetic experiences in nature as well. For some recent discussion of 
environmental aesthetics, see for example: Berleant 2005, 2012; Brady 2003, 2013; Carlson 2008; 
Parsons 2008a and 2008b; and Saito 2007. 
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ineffability, as well as the kinds of answer each one of those questions would require. 
Section 3 investigates arguments that seek to locate aesthetic ineffability within the 
object of aesthetic experiences, i.e. within aesthetic content. Section 4 discusses 
arguments that seek to locate aesthetic ineffability within the subject of aesthetic 
experience. The conclusion summarizes the current state of the debate and indicates 
the most promising directions for further research on aesthetic ineffability. 
1 History and Terminology 
The conviction that there are aspects of reality that cannot be expressed in language, 
even though our minds can somehow grasp them, is as old as philosophy itself. 
Already in the ancient writings of Gorgias we find an argument with a substantial 
ineffability thesis about some aspects of reality (Sextus Empiricus 7.65), as well as in 
several Daoist scriptures (e.g. Laozi §1, §41) and in Plotinus’ Enneads (e.g. Book V, Ch. 
3, Passage 13). In medieval times, the ineffability of God was a central theme in 
Maimonides’ writings (e.g. 204). It also appears in several places of Aquinas’ Summa 
Theologica (e.g. Ia.12, IIa-IIae.11.3-4) as well as in his famous prayer “Creator 
ineffabilis”. Kant speaks of the world as a “showplace of manifoldness, order, 
purposiveness, and beauty” that can be grasped only in “speechless, but nonetheless 
eloquent, astonishment.” (e.g. Kant 1998 [1787]: B650). Schopenhauer speaks 
similarly of the ‘Will’, the most fundamental ontological category, or essence, of the 
world (e.g. §31). Also Nietzsche (e.g. 880), Heidegger (e.g. Language, 59), Adorno (Hegel, 
102), and Wittgenstein (e.g. Tractatus, §5.62, §6.522) argue, each in their own way, that 
reality or some aspects thereof cannot be grasped by language. 
While it is in this sense indeed true to say that “the spirit of ineffability in 
philosophy is subtly pervasive” (Sheffer 129), it is also true that the special connection 
between ineffability and aesthetics only started to emerge in the writings of the 
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romanticists of the eighteenth century. In his Critique of Judgement, Kant argues that 
aesthetic ideas are “representations that provoke more thought than admits of 
expression in a concept determined by words” (177), a notion later picked up by 
Schelling (e.g. 231), Schopenhauer (e.g. §31), Heidegger (Work of Art, 204, 206), and 
Adorno (Aesthetic Theory, 126-129), all of whom advance the closely related idea that art 
manages to communicate something that is essentially beyond the reach of language. 
But what exactly does it mean to say that an artwork is ineffable? What is the 
relevant notion of ineffability in this context? After all, something can be ineffable for 
trivial reasons, i.e. reasons that are in principle removable. For example, my name is 
“ineffable” to a person who doesn’t know it, but this ineffability would disappear as 
soon as I would tell her my name. However, aesthetic ineffability is not trivial in this 
way – it cannot be “removed” in any obvious way. 
What counts as ineffable also depends on what counts as ‘language’ (Only natural 
languages? If so, only literal or also metaphorical? Or is art perhaps a language of its 
own?) and who counts as a ‘competent speaker’ (A native speaker of the language in 
question? A person with significant knowledge of art? A professional art critic?). 
Depending on how we define ‘language’ and ‘speaker’, and depending on which 
obstacles to expression we count as trivial or not, there are numerous ways of defining 
ineffability, and every definition will be to a significant extent a matter of choice 
rather than a matter of necessity. 
The concept of aesthetic ineffability used in this essay denotes a kind of ineffability 
that is (a) absolute, i.e. not subject-dependent; (b) non-trivial in the sense of essentially 
unremovable; and (c) relates to natural languages (nd competent speakers of natural 
languages) only, literally interpreted. A bit more formally, 
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An aesthetic item y [e.g. a work of art; an aesthetic experience2] is 
ineffable if and only if it is metaphysically impossible that there be a 
linguistic item x [e.g. a sentence, utterance, or proposition] whose content 
non-trivially and literally entails the content of y and whose content is, in 
principle, comprehensible by and communicable to beings with a human 
cognitive appartus.3 
 
These choices are not arbitrary: I believe that they best reflect the way aesthetic 
ineffability is intuitively understood. The way the concept is used in the literature (see 
the section on history above and sections 2-4) suggests that aesthetic ineffability is 
commonly thought of as universal, i.e. subject-independent, and non-trivial. The focus 
on natural-language ineffability is justified by the same reasoning, in addition to the 
technical factor that it is not at all clear what the semantics of a non-linguistic 
language would look like – a question that would need to be clarified before an 
investigation of aesthetic ineffability could even get started. The focus on literal 
language is necessary in order to exclude an interpretation of aesthetic ineffability 
according to which every piece of literature or poetry trivially expresses itself. 
A further distinction that needs to be made is between ‘expression’ and 
‘description.’ An artwork whose meaning or content is taken to be ineffable will still be 
describable. The meaning of Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain might be ineffable in the 
sense clarified above, though it is perfectly possible to describe that object as a 
porcelain urinal that was converted into an object of art, etc. Intuitively, an expression 
captures the full content of whatever is expressed, whereas a description usually covers 
only parts. 
This leads us straight to the next question: what exactly do we mean when we 
speak of ‘content’? It is a term with numerous interpretations, and it is not clear that 
                                                      
2 What we call an ‘aesthetic item’ depends on how we ascribe the predicate ‘aesthetic:’ 
sometimes it is the object of an experience that is called ‘aesthetic,’ sometimes it is the 
experience itself that is called ‘aesthetic,’ sometimes both (see below). 
3 For an extensive discussion of the various ways in which ineffability can be defined, 
and of the factors that determine such a definition, see Jonas 2016: 38-49. 
Silvia Jonas 
 5 
we have all the same thing in mind when we speak about the content of a work of art. 
One important distinction that needs to be mentioned is the distinction between 
propositional and non-propositional content. The content of a sentence is 
propositional, whereas the content of a perceptual experience is non-propositional. 
Poetry is an essentially propositional art form, painting an essentially non-
propositional one, pop music is a hybrid. Usually, what is understood by the ‘content 
of a work of art’ is the conjunction of its propositional content (if it has any), its 
perceptual features,4 and a third element that may or may not be reducible to a 
combination of the other two elements and that is sometimes identified with the 
artwork’s meaning. The question of aesthetic ineffability can also be understood as the 
question whether (some) works of art have a meaning that goes beyond the sum of its 
propositional and perceptual components.5 
Philosophical examinations of aesthetic ineffability have been sparse – only few 
contemporary philosophers have examined the topic in any detail. Before we can 
proceed to a discussion of the main accounts that have so far been put forth, we must 
identify the different possible questions that may be asked with regard to aesthetic 
ineffability. 
                                                      
4 Since the perceptual features of an artwork then determine the content of the mental 
state of the perceiving subject, an artwork’s perceptual features are sometimes referred 
to as the artwork’s perceptual content. 
5 Compare Simon Blackburn’s definition of (linguistic) meaning: “Whatever it is that 
makes what would otherwise be mere sounds and inscriptions into instruments of 
communication and understanding.” (Blackburn 1996: 235) A suitable adaptation for 
works of art should include, besides sounds and inscriptions, such things as colours, 
forms, movements, etc. 
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2 What Exactly Are We Asking? 
Works of art are often perceived as expressive,6 and hence, as having content. In order 
to discriminate between the content of works of art and other types of content, such as 
propositional content or the content of ordinary perceptual experience, the content of 
works of art is referred to as aesthetic content. What distinguishes aesthetic content from 
other types of content is that it can evoke a feeling of meaningfulness, i.e. a feeling 
phenomenally similar to ordinary states of understanding, that resists linguistic 
expression: works of art cannot be ‘paraphrased’ or ‘translated’ into (literal) language 
without remainder (cf. Kennick, Art, 309). This is just a different way of saying that the 
meaning of a work of art is perceived as more than a combination of its propositional 
and perceptual components, which in turn suggests that aesthetic content is 
inextricably linked to its respective form of presentation: the contents of a symphony 
by Gustav Mahler, for example, can only be expressed in its musical form, not 
linguistically. 7  Trying to separate aesthetic content from its specific form of 
presentation means committing the proverbial ‘heresy of paraphrase’. In this sense, 
aesthetic content can be said to be ineffable. 
In addition to having content, works of art also afford experiences. In order to 
discriminate between ordinary perceptual experiences and experiences afforded by 
                                                      
6 There is no agreement over the question whether all artworks, including conceptual 
or performance art, are expressive, and whether aesthetic experiences of natural 
settings require nature to be expressive. Object-based accounts of aesthetic ineffability 
must presuppose the expressiveness of all artworks and natural settings in order to 
explain aesthetic ineffability. Subject-based accounts are better equipped to 
accommodate the intuition that only some aesthetic experiences are due to the 
presence of an expressive artwork or natural setting (see below). 
7 I will ignore complications such as the question whether or not a different work of 
art (say, a poem) could potentially express the contents of a Mahler symphony. As 
mentioned in section 1, answering such a question would require a clear account of 
non-linguistic semantics based on which we can decide whether or not two works of 
art express the same content. Since there are no such accounts, every answer to the 
question whether or not different works of art can express the same content would be 
mere speculation. 
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works of art, the latter are referred to as aesthetic experiences. What distinguishes aesthetic 
experiences from other types of experience is that they often involve a specific state of 
mind that is impossible to put into language: no expression seems adequate to capture 
the quality of being in that state of mind. 
The reason it is important to point out the difference between aesthetic 
experience and aesthetic content is that aesthetic ineffability could either be a matter 
of a specific type of ineffable content, or a matter of a specific type of ineffable state of 
mind. There are thus two principal directions for an investigation of the ineffability 
associated with aesthetic contexts: we can look for an explanation of aesthetic 
ineffability within the object of aesthetic experiences, i.e. within works of arts and their 
contents, or we can turn to the subject of an aesthetic experience. 
In addition to these two principal directions, we need to get a clear picture of 
the possible questions that may be raised with regard to aesthetic ineffability. One 
question we could be asking is why aesthetic content cannot be translated into literal 
language, or more precisely, what reason there is to believe that it is in principle 
impossible, for any given piece of aesthetic content AC, to provide rules of translation 
from AC in its ‘aesthetic’ expression into a ‘literal’ expression, such that applying 
those rules will result in a conceptual equivalent of AC. In order to answer this 
question, an account if aesthetic ineffability has to provide, as it were, a “technical” 
reason for the untranslatability of aesthetic content into language. 
However, given that not only aesthetic contents but also the phenomenal 
contents of ordinary sense perceptions (“qualia”) have been argued to be ineffable,8 a 
second question we might be interested in is what, if anything, distinguishes the 
                                                      
8 See, for example, Jackson 1982, 1986; McDowell 1998; Moore 1997; Nagel 1974. 
For an overview of the debate about the ineffability of qualia, see Jonas 2016 Chs. 3 
and 5. 
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(reasons for) aesthetic ineffability from the ineffability of the phenomenal contents of 
ordinary sense perceptions. In order to answer this question, an account has to 
provide an explanation of ineffability that applies only to aesthetic contexts. Moreover, 
such an account would have to apply uniformly to all instances of aesthetic ineffability: 
to the visual and musical arts as well as to literature and poetry, and across all genres 
of artistic expression (representational, conceptual, performative). It is not at all clear 
that it is possible to develop a uniform account that ranges across such a disparate 
assortment of things. However, on the non-trivial assumption that experiences of aesthetic 
ineffability are phenomenally similar even though the respective artistic genre may 
differ, it would be desirable for any theory to provide a uniform explanation of 
aesthetic ineffability independently of artistic genres. 
A third question that could be raised is why the ineffability we experience in 
aesthetic contexts feels meaningful. This is an extremely important question, given that 
it is the aspect of meaningfulness that distinguishes aesthetic ineffability from other, 
more trivial forms of ineffability (such as the ineffability of our ordinary perceptual 
experiences). 
Ideally, a theory of aesthetic ineffability should address all three of the above 
mentioned questions, thus providing (a) an explanation of the untranslatability of 
aesthetic content that (b) applies uniformly to all and only instances of aesthetic 
ineffability that (c) explains our evaluation of that ineffability as meaningful. In fact, 
however, most accounts of aesthetic ineffability address only a subset of those 
questions, and (as was mentioned above) it is not clear that one uniform account could 
ever answer all three questions. 
We will now examine each account with regard to the questions identified 
above, starting with accounts that locate aesthetic ineffability within the object of an 
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aesthetic experience (section 3). We will then proceed to accounts that locate aesthetic 
ineffability within the subject of an aesthetic experience (section 4). 
3 Aesthetic Ineffability: A Matter of Aesthetic Content? 
The most straightforward way to explain the ineffability found in aesthetic contexts is 
to invoke an intrinsic difference between aesthetic and linguistic content. Arguments 
of this kind are based on two premises. The first premise is that aesthetic content is (in 
some vaguely specified way) intrinsically different from linguistic content.9 The second 
premise is that no translation between such intrinsically different contents is possible. 
From these two premises, the conclusion is inferred that aesthetic content cannot be 
translated into linguistic content. Arguments to this effect have been provided, for 
example, by Susanne Langer and John Dewey. Langer argues that 
“every work of art expresses, more or less purely, more or less subtly, not feelings 
and emotions which the artist has, but feelings and emotions which the artist 
knows ... Such knowledge is not expressible in ordinary discourse. The reason for 
this ineffability is not that the ideas to be expressed are too high, too spiritual, or 
too anything-else, but that the forms of feeling and the forms of discursive 
expression are logically incommensurate, so that any exact concepts of feeling 
and emotion cannot be projected into the logical form of literal language. Verbal 
statement ... is almost useless for conveying knowledge about the precise 
character of our affective life.” (Langer 91) 
 
For her, works of art are symbols that present ideas and emotions (rather than describing 
them). Similarly, Dewey argues that works of art manage to express what is 
unavailable in language. He writes: 
“If all meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of painting and 
music would not exist. There are values and meanings that can be expressed only 
by immediately visible and audible qualities, and to ask what they mean in the 
sense of something that can be put into words is to deny their distinctive 
existence.” (Dewey 77) 
 
                                                      
9 To be perfectly accurate, we should speak of literal linguistic content here: after all, poems are works of 
art with linguistic content. For simplicity’s sake, I will continue to use the term ‘linguistic content’, and 
if not otherwise stated, I will mean literal linguistic content by that. 
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So according to both Langer and Dewey, art manages to express certain types of 
phenomenal content – for example the phenomenal character of emotions such as 
fear, hate love, etc. (Dewey 67) –, in a way that is ‘more true’ to those emotions than a 
linguistic expression could ever be.  
The crucial question now is how this alleged additional expressive power 
should be explained: is it some mysterious property that gives aesthetic content its 
expressive power? If so, no arguments to this effect have been developed. The 
mysterious expressiveness of aesthetic content has more often been declared than 
properly argued for. What has been argued for, on the other hand, is that the expressive 
power of aesthetic content trivially surpasses that of language. This is because we can 
never experience a proposition in the way we can experience a work of art: 
“poems and paintings have meanings and values that ordinary prose descriptions 
do not have. Pictures have colour, depth, balance, chiaroscuro, design; 
propositions do not. Poems have measured rhythm and rhyme, striking images 
and involved metaphors; ordinary prose statements do not. These are things we 
enjoy in pictures and poems, but they do not express values that cannot be 
expressed in words; they are ‘values’ that prose statements do not ordinarily 
have.” (Kennick , Art, 316). 
 
In other words, the means of aesthetic expression trivially outstrip those of linguistic 
expression: propositions appeal mainly to our cognitive abilities whereas works of art 
appeal to all five senses of perception. A colour or a tone cannot be rendered in 
language, just like a protractor cannot draw square circles (Kennick, Art, 318). There 
is no mystery here, only a category mistake. 
For this reason, Stephen Davies argues that we should resist the temptation to 
think that works of art communicate ineffable truths. He explains aesthetic ineffability, 
specifically in music, with “a degree of detail and resolution in auditory expressions 
that exceeds the possibility of verbal description or specification, and not some new 
dimension of the eternal verities” (161). What distinguishes perceptual experiences 
from linguistic descriptions thereof is the “seamless plenitude” (159) of the former. 
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Based on this, he concludes that there is no reason for us to consider aesthetic 
ineffability anymore puzzling than ordinary perceptual ineffability. 
Kennick and Davies thus maintain that aesthetic content is ineffable for the same 
(trivial) reasons other phenomenal experiences are ineffable, and that arguments 
trying to establish a difference between aesthetic ineffability and ordinary phenomenal 
ineffability are misguided. However, such a view fails to make sense of the 
meaningfulness associated with aesthetic ineffability (in contradistinction to ordinary 
instances of ineffability): unlike ordinary phenomenal experiences such as looking at a 
red wall, aesthetic experiences are phenomenally similar to states of understanding. 
What arguments like Kennick’s and Davies’ do manage to show, however, is that 
simply postulating an intrinsic difference between aesthetic content and other, more 
familiar kinds of content, is not sufficient. If we are to believe in a genuine difference 
between aesthetic and ordinary perceptual content, we must be given a substantial 
explanation for this difference. 
John Spackman and Diana Raffman argue that the expressive qualities of 
some works of art, especially in music, are more fine-grained than our conceptual 
resources. According to Spackman, this is because the number of potential 
connections we can make between a given work of art on the one hand, and the 
human emotions that can be argued to be expressed by it on the other, is likely to be 
higher than those specified in any actual description (Spackman 2012: 308). However, 
this should not lead us to conclude that every single work of art expresses one unique 
emotion, given that we can think of cases where two works of art differ slightly with 
regard to their perceptual qualities without differing with regard to the emotion they 
express. Spackman argues only for a moderate ineffability claim: our interpretations of 
Silvia Jonas 
 12 
works of art could always potentially be expanded by additional suitable descriptions, 
but none of these potential descriptions is in principle ineffable. 
 Raffman develops a different argument for the fine-grained-ness of aesthetic 
content (1988, 1993). Focusing on the example of ineffable musical experiences, she 
argues that certain musical ‘nuances’ can often not be mentally categorized (‘type-
identified’) in the way necessary for verbal expression. Employing cognitivist theories 
of perception (Fodor 1983) as well as examinations of generative grammar for tonal 
music (Lehrdahl and Jackendoff 1983), Raffman argues that the source of musical 
ineffability lies somewhere in “the unconscious computation of a series of increasingly 
abstract mental representations of an acoustic signal” (Raffman 1993: 4). She develops 
a threefold account of musical ineffability, with ‘structural ineffability’ denoting 
certain limitations in a listener’s access to the way in which she represents musical 
structure, ‘feeling ineffability’ denoting the ineffable aspect of every perceptual/ 
phenomenal experience, including musical experience, and ‘nuance ineffability’ 
denoting our inability to cognitively classify certain aspects of music too fine-grained 
for cognitive conceptualization. More precisely, Raffman argues (83ff.) that certain 
auditory nuances are recovered too early in the processes involved in representing 
musical signals (i.e. on the “shallowest” levels of these processes), so that we fail to 
mentally categorize them in the manner necessary for conceptualization. 
Fineness-of-grain accounts thus provide a “technical” reason for aesthetic 
ineffability, but no way to separate aesthetic from non-aesthetic instances of 
ineffability, and no explanation of the associated meaningfulness. Roger Scruton 
criticises Raffman’s account for this very reason and points out that “the sense of an 
ineffable meaning is a rare phenomenon, in comparison to the abundance of tonal 
music” (1997: 200) – a fact that cannot be explained on the basis of a fineness-of-grain 
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account of ineffability. Also Jerrold Levinson (1995) holds that “the ineffability of 
greatest interest” (201) within the context of music cannot be explained in terms of a 
mere difficulty in denoting certain auditory nuances. Moreover, as Raffman herself 
concedes (1993: 84), it is not clear that the kind of ineffability she describes cannot be 
overcome, for example by enlarging our discriminative abilities through certain types 
of auditory training. Thus, her argument provides no reason to believe that aesthetic 
content is in principle ineffable. 
Arguments from demonstrative concepts give us additional reason to believe 
that a mere fineness of grain cannot establish the kind of aesthetic ineffability we are 
after. As argued by McDowell (1994) for the case of perceptual content in general, 
and by Spackman (2012) and Jonas (2016) for aesthetic content in particular, the 
fineness of grain of any given perceptual input can always be captured by a combined 
use of demonstrative concepts (such as ‘this’ or ‘that’) with a higher-order sortal (such 
as ‘red’ or ‘scarlet’ or ‘sadness’).10 Even if a visual shade or tonal nuance we perceive 
in a given work of art is so fine that no expression in our current conceptual repertoire 
captures it accurately, we always have the option of picking the shade or nuance out 
demonstratively, while using a higher-order sortal to point in the relevant direction: 
‘That shade of red!’ or ‘That melancholy tone!’. Such a demonstration can then serve 
as the basis for establishing a canonical term for whatever has been picked out (‘Let’s 
call that shade of red ‘scarlet’ and that shade of blue ‘Le bleu de Chartres!’). It is 
reasonable to believe that such processes are involved in any case of language 
expansion. 
                                                      
10 Such a demonstrative strategy is also implicit in Tiger Roholt’s (2010) argument that musical nuances 
can be made effable by comparison, for example by comparing a certain kind of brightness in a given 
piece of music (‘This brightness!’) to the brightness achieved in a different piece of music (‘That 
brightness!’). 
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A different class of arguments tries to account for aesthetic ineffability, not 
with a difference in nature between ordinary cognitive content on the one hand, and 
aesthetic content on the other, but rather, with a difference in function.  
Rafael DeClercq employs a cognitive account by Michael Polanyi and Harry 
Prosch (1975) in order to explain the ineffability of aesthetic content in terms of the 
way such content functions. According to Polanyi and Prosch, the structure of 
perceptual awareness is twofold, i.e. characterized by a focal and a subsidiary aspect: 
there are some elements we attend to focally, and some we attend to merely 
subsidiarily. When we read a letter, for example, our focal attention is usually on the 
content of the letter, whereas we give only subsidiary attention to secondary aspects, 
such as the structure of the paper, or even the language the letter is written in 
(DeClercq 93). This view can be supported by the fact that we tend to remember 
whatever we attended to focally in a perceptual experience, whereas we tend to forget 
whatever we attended to only subsidiarily. 
What distinguishes ordinary perceptual from aesthetic experience is that in the 
latter case, both the focal and the subsidiary aspects of the experience are appreciated 
in their own right: 
“On the one hand, we focus intensely on the character (say, the beauty) of an 
object. Yet on the other hand, we retain awareness, equally intense, of something 
that lies outside the focus of our attention. To be more precise: while focussing 
on the aesthetic character of the object, we attend in a subsidiary manner to 
whatever it is that lends this focal object its special significance” (DeClercq 93).” 
 
What is ineffable about an aesthetic experience on this account is the interplay of 
subsidiary elements (such as the bass line, the melody, the brush strokes, the rhyme, 
etc.) and “the way these various parts contribute to and are integrated into a whole” 
(DeClercq 96). A subsidiary element of a work of art is unspecifiable, and thus 
ineffable, because “as soon as we shift our attention to it and start to examine it 
focally, its meaning changes” (DeClercq 94). In other words, as soon as we try to focus 
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on the subsidiary elements, they stop being subsidiary and thus, change their 
character. 
Despite the fact that DeClercq’s account of a twofold structure of perceptual 
awareness has some intuitive plausibility, it is not clear why it should be in principle 
impossible to attend focally to the subsidiary elements of a work of art, for example to 
the way a work of art integrates its different elements into a composite whole. It may 
be true that we typically don’t attend to subsidiary elements when we perceive a work 
of art, but this does not mean that we cannot attend to them in principle. Further 
argument is needed in order to establish such a claim. Moreover, just as the above 
discussed fineness-of-grain accounts, DeClercq’s theory does explain the 
meaningfulness that attaches to aesthetic, but not to ordinary perceptual experiences. 
Michael Luntley finds another way of arguing that some musical content 
differs from ordinary perceptual content in the functional role it plays for our 
perceptual experiences. What makes his argument stand out is that it is designed 
specifically to resist counterarguments to aesthetic ineffability that employ the notion 
of demonstrative concepts (as discussed in section 4). Luntley begins by explaining that 
only those parts of our perceptual contents that can potentially figure in a person’s 
“space of reasons” are apt to be captured by our (demonstrative) concepts: 
“If subject S has a conceptual capacity for discriminating F-ness (their experience 
represents F-ness in some way), the representation of F-ness must be capable of 
contributing to the rational organization of their behaviour by figuring in their 
inferential reasons for belief/action. ... The capacity to discriminate F-ness as 
contributing to the content of the subject’s experience is non-conceptual if and 
only if the capacity cannot contribute to the subject’s rational organization of 
their behaviour.” (Luntley 406/ 407) 
 
In other words, only contents that can potentially be employed in the deliberative 
processes that guide our beliefs and actions can be brought into conceptual form. He 
then goes on to argue that some musical experiences, notably those that involve 
inexperienced listeners, feature ineffable content that cannot even be captured by the 
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use of demonstrative concepts. For example, a musical novice will be able to hear and 
discriminate the specific tonal quality of a dominant 7th chord (its ‘pulling-towards-
resolution’), but due to her lack of musical education, the novice will lack the 
vocabulary, specifically the higher-order sortals, that would be necessary to generate a 
demonstrative concept. But without the ability to capture a piece of content, even if 
only by means of a compound demonstrative concept, it is impossible for it to figure in 
a person’ space of reasons, i.e. in the inferences a person draws in order to rationally 
organize their beliefs and behaviour. Hence, Luntley concludes, we have a case of 
non-conceptual content. 
Luntley’s argument is interesting because it takes into account the notion of 
demonstrative concepts by means of which most fineness-of-grain arguments can be 
disabled, and because it makes the specific functional role of being able to feature in a 
subject’s space of reasons a condition for the expressibility of a given piece of content. 
However, the argument does not provide a satisfactory account of aesthetic ineffability 
for three reasons.11 The first one is that musical training would likely remove the 
novice’s inability to demonstratively point out a given piece of musical content. 
Hence, Luntley’s argument is an argument for relative ineffability only: at best, it 
shows why some pieces of musical content are ineffable relative to an inexperienced 
listener, but nothing in his argument gives us reason to think that some musical 
qualities are in principle ineffable. Second, his examples are strictly auditory (in fact, 
he concedes that it is unlikely that his argument could be made for a visual case, given 
the richness of everyone’s, even the novice’s, visual vocabulary – Luntley 418), so that 
his account cannot explain all and only cases of aesthetic ineffability. Third, Luntley’s 
argument is unsuitable to explain the meaningfulness of aesthetic ineffability. This is 
                                                      
11 To be fair, it must be noted that the goal of Luntley’ argument is to make a case for non-conceptual 
content in music that resists capture by demonstrative concepts; his goal is not to explain aesthetic 
ineffability. 
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because, arguably, the meaningfulness of aesthetic content is not a function of a 
person’s conceptual resources: both a novice and an experienced listener (i.e. a person 
whose broad musical vocabulary would enable her to express whatever tonal nuance 
she wished) would feel unable to express the meaningfulness of a piece of music. 
Luntley’s account offers no explanation for this fact. 
It thus seems fair to conclude that arguments seeking to locate aesthetic ineffability 
within the object of an aesthetic experience, i.e. within aesthetic content itself, at best 
manage to establish a relative, rather than an absolute kind of ineffability. Moreover, 
they don’t offer a uniform account applicable to all and only aesthetic genres; and 
most importantly, they don’t provide an explanation for the meaningfulness associated 
with aesthetic ineffability. We will now turn to accounts that seek to locate aesthetic 
ineffability within the subject of an aesthetic experience. 
4 Aesthetic Ineffability – A Matter of Ineffable Knowledge? 
Object-based accounts of ineffability are based on the intuition that it is something 
about the artwork itself that is ineffable, and hence, explains the experience of 
ineffability. Subject-based accounts, on the other hand, are founded on the intuition 
that we do not necessarily need to presuppose the existence of artworks expressing 
ineffable contents in order to explain aesthetic ineffability. Rather, aesthetic 
ineffability can be explained as a feature of the experience of an artwork, rather than the 
artwork itself. 
An intuitive argument for the claim that aesthetic ineffability thus originates in the 
subject’s experience rather than in the artwork is that aesthetic experiences are not 
necessarily repeatable: two people can have different reactions to the same work of 
art, one of them experiencing it as ineffably meaningful, the other experiencing it as 
rubbish. Likewise, one and the same person can have different reactions to the same 
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work of art at two different points in time. Malcolm Budd seems to have a related 
thought in mind when he argues that it is not their meaning that makes artworks seem 
irreplaceable us, but rather, the extraordinary experiences they afford (84-85). Also 
Roger Scruton holds that “If we value art, it is partly because it introduces new states 
of mind, by providing the expressive gestures that convey them.” (361f) So the 
question is whether there is reason to believe that it is the aesthetic experience itself 
that is ineffable, and not something about the work of art itself. In other words, do 
aesthetic experiences afford states of mind that cannot be put into words? 
Roger Scruton argues that the ineffability of aesthetic experiences stems from 
the fact that perceiving a work of art can give us ‘first-person awareness’ (364) of 
certain emotions embodied in a work of art. This is because they encourage Einfühlung 
(German for ‘empathy’), an imaginative projection of one’s own perspective into the 
perspective of another. In order to understand the ineffability claim contained in this 
picture, Scruton draws the following parallel between ordinary perceptual cases and 
the aesthetic case. We can imagine Siegfried, a person who has never felt fear in his 
life, but who knows how fear is described by those who have felt it themselves. So 
Siegfried has descriptive, third-person knowledge of what feeling fear is like, but he 
lacks first-person knowledge – knowledge-by-acquaintance.12 Scruton now argues that 
one way for Siegfried to acquire first-person knowledge of fear is by Einfühlung: 
“There is a kind of response to your face and gestures which makes your first-
person perspective available to me. I imagine what it is like to be you, feeling this; 
I then entertain your emotion within my own point of view. There is nothing to 
be said about what I thereby come to know, for there is no new proposition that I 
know.” (Scruton 362) 
 
Once we accept this claim, it seems like a small step to the aesthetic case: 
                                                      
12 Scruton’s description here is structurally analogous to Frank Jackson’s Mary (Jackson 1986), a poor 
creature confined to a black-and-white room who knows every descriptive physical fact about colour 
perception, but who lacks first-person experience of colours such as red. 
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“The ineffability of artistic meaning is, I suggest, simply a special case of the 
ineffability of first-person awareness – the impossibility of translating ‘what it is 
like’ into a description.” (Scruton 362/364) 
 
However, as plausible as this step may seem at first, it leaves several crucial questions 
open. For example: whose perspective, emotions, or inner life do we gain awareness of 
in aesthetic experiences? The artist’s? But that seems odd, given that an artist could 
have written a sad piece of music without having felt sad himself. It seems more likely 
that what Scruton had in mind was that we get acquainted with particular emotions, 
such as sadness or joy, independently of a subject feeling those emotions. Yet this 
interpretation clearly implies a number of contentious metaphysical assumptions, for 
example that there exist universals (such as emotions) that we can get acquainted with; 
that works of art express emotions; that the emotions expressed by a work of art are 
determinate, etc. For some, committing themselves to all those assumptions might be 
too high a price to pay for a theory of aesthetic ineffability. 
However, Scruton’s account of aesthetic ineffability also has several merits: 
though developed with regard to music, his account can be applied to all artistic 
genres: a painting can give us knowledge-by-acquaintance of a certain emotion just as 
a piece of music, a sculpture, or a performance could. Moreover, Scruton’s account 
has at least some potential to explain the meaningfulness associated with aesthetic 
ineffability: if the ineffability of aesthetic experiences consists in gaining first-person 
knowledge of certain deep emotions, then it is precisely our experience of those 
emotions that can account for us being deeply moved. 
At this point, however, one might object that Einfühlung can also happen, say, 
when we read the newspaper and empathize with the suffering of refugees – Einfühlung 
doesn’t require the presence of a work of art – but we don’t experience meaningful 
ineffability while reading newspapers. Hence, it is not clear that the concept of 
Einfühlung captures something that is unique to aesthetic experiences, and thus, 
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uniquely characterizes aesthetic ineffability. But perhaps it is indeed misguided to look 
at aesthetic ineffability as a unique concept in need of a unique explanation. Perhaps 
we need to gain some understanding of the general concept of ineffability before we can 
understand the sub-category of aesthetic ineffability. This brings us to our final 
approach. 
In (2016), Silvia Jonas argues that meaningful ineffable experiences occur in 
aesthetic as well as religious and philosophical contexts. She then raises the question 
how the ineffability experienced in such moments can be explained metaphysically. 
Four potential candidates are examined – ineffable objects and properties; ineffable 
propositions; ineffable content; and ineffable knowledge – and Jonas argues that only 
the latter has the potential to explain ineffability in a metaphysically coherent way, i.e. 
in a way that doesn’t require us to introduce doubtful ontological categories, which 
then need to be squared with our existing ontology. While the term ‘knowledge’ in 
philosophy is often associated with propositional knowledge, she argues that also 
ineffable (non-propositional) forms of knowledge pervade our lives: knowledge-how, 
indexical knowledge and phenomenal knowledge (gained through acquaintance) are 
all not suitable for linguistic expression. However, they also don’t strike us as 
particularly meaningful. Jonas argues that the reason those forms of knowledge are 
ineffable is that they are self-referential: knowledge-how enables the move from a 
description of how to ride a bike to riding a bike ourselves; indexical knowledge enables 
the correct self-ascription of properties and thus, locating ourselves in the world; 
phenomenal knowledge accommodates the what-it-is-like for ourselves of getting 
acquainted with the world through sense-perception. Given that these forms of 
knowledge clearly imply the existence of a (possibly primitive, possibly ontologically 
thin) entity that we call the ‘Self’ and that is the ultimate reference point for every 
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human experience, Jonas suggests that meaningful ineffability, as experienced in 
(some) aesthetic, religious, and philosophical contexts, consists in getting 
phenomenally acquainted with that Self (Jonas 167ff). This way of understanding 
aesthetic ineffability, i.e. as a sub-category of the larger category of meaningful 
ineffability, provides an answer to all three questions identified at the beginning, at the 
price of aligning aesthetic ineffability with other forms of ineffability not necessarily 
connected to works of art or aesthetic experiences. Thus, Jonas’ account provides an 
explanation of the ineffability of aesthetic experiences in terms of the general, well-
known, and unmysterious ineffability of phenomenal knowledge (161ff); it thus applies 
uniformly to all instances of aesthetic ineffability as well as to religious and 
philosophical ineffability; and it can account for the meaningfulness we associate with 
aesthetic ineffability through the Self the object we get acquainted with.  
5 Conclusion: Whereto From Here? 
Depending on which of the three main questions with regard to aesthetic ineffability 
one is most interested in, different accounts are on offer. Most work has gone into 
finding a “technical” reason for aesthetic ineffability, while questions regarding the 
uniformity of aesthetic ineffability and the distinction between aesthetic and ordinary 
perceptual ineffability are still underdeveloped. The aspect of meaningfulness is 
arguably best explained by accounts locating aesthetic ineffability within the subject, 
rather than the object, of aesthetic ineffability, though further research on this would 
be desirable. A question that remains open until today is why some works of art seem 
to trigger ineffable experiences, whereas others do not. But this is a question that 
arises for all accounts of ineffability, and perhaps one that art critics are better 
equipped to answer than philosophers. 
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